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“One Giant Leap
[Backwards] for Mankind”

1

LIMITED LIABILITY IN
PRIVATE COMMERCIAL SPACEFLIGHT
INTRODUCTION
In 2014, six people aboard Virgin Galactic’s
SpaceShipTwo will likely become the first paying customers to
fly on a private commercial spacecraft.2 Passengers on that
historic two-and-a-half hour flight3 will see “spectacular views”4

1 This is an abbreviated version of Neil Armstrong’s iconic first words as he
“became the first person ever to step onto another planetary body.” Neil Armstrong:
1930–2012, NASA (Aug. 25, 2012), http://www.nasa.gov/topics/people/features/
armstrong_obit.html. Armstrong’s words in their entirety were: “That is one small step
for (a) man, one giant leap for mankind.” Id.
2 Overview: Spaceships, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/
overview/spaceships (last visited Aug. 19, 2013); Virgin Galactic Flexes SpaceShipTwo’s
Unique Feather Mechanism in Second Supersonic Flight, VIRGIN GALACTIC (May 9, 2013),
http://www.virgingalactic.com/news/item/virgin-galactic-flexes-spaceshiptwos-uniquefeather-mechanism-in-second-supersonic-flight; see Frans G. von der Dunk, Passing the
Buck to Rogers: International Liability Issues in Private Spaceflight, 86 NEB. L. REV.
400, 403 (2007–2008). With the exception of test flights for upcoming commercial
spacecraft, all prior manned spaceflight has been aboard government-owned vehicles.
See MATTHEW J. KLEINMAN ET AL., THE LAWS OF SPACEFLIGHT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR NEW
SPACE LAWYERS 39-45, 48 (2012); see also Clara Moskowitz, Suborbital Space Ready to
Take Flight, Experts Say, SPACE.COM (June 25, 2012), http://www.space.com/16291suborbital-space-research-flights.html (“While the [commercial spaceflight] companies
have been conducting test flights, none have yet flown a commercial mission.”). SpaceX
has the distinction of being the only company to launch a commercial spacecraft that
has docked with the International Space Station, but the capsule was unmanned.
Victoria Jaggard & Ker Than, SpaceX’s Dragon Captured By Space Station—A First,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (May 25, 2012), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2012/05/
120525-spacex-dragon-robot-arm-international-space-station-nation.
3 The flight will be suborbital, which is “spaceflight where the spacecraft
reaches outer space, but does not have sufficient energy to complete a full revolution
around the Earth before reentering the atmosphere.” KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2,
at 30. While “there is no international agreement on where outer space begins,” see von
der Dunk, supra note 2, at 424, for the limited purposes of this discussion, suborbital
flight, when it exceeds the Kármán Line, a distance 100 km above sea level, will be
termed as spaceflight. KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 3. The Kármán Line is the
“most commonly accepted demarcation between atmosphere and outer space.” Id.
4 Overview:
Experience, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/
overview/experience (last visited Sept. 8, 2013).
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of Earth and experience six minutes of weightlessness5 in what
promises to be a life-changing experience.6 In that time, the
spaceflight participants will be free to unstrap from their seats
and “float, tumble, even get married.”7 But no amount of
enthrallment can prevent the inevitable corollary to the private
sector’s maiden spaceflight: the first commercial spaceflightrelated lawsuit.8
As with any lawsuit, the ultimate issue will be liability.9
And as with any previously unlitigated issue, the proceedings
to determine liability will likely be “messy, expensive, and
unpredictable.”10 Given the high costs of the initial flights,11
5 Virgin
Galactic:
Flame
On,
ECONOMIST
(Apr.
29,
2013),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2013/04/virgin-galactic; David Warmflash,
About Those Space Joyrides . . . , AIR & SPACE MAG. (Jan. 6, 2012), available at
http://www.airspacemag.com/space-exploration/About-Those-Space-Joyrides.html.
6 See Overview: Experience, supra note 4 (“[Y]ou know that life will never
quite be the same again.”).
7 Warmflash, supra note 5. But some warn that permitting customers to
freely maneuver in the cabin during suborbital flights could be dangerous. See, e.g., id.
(“‘Unstrapping and re-strapping in such a short time frame would be a risky endeavor,’
says the company’s [XCOR, a private spaceflight company] communications
representative, Mike Masse.”).
8 See, e.g., SIMON ADEBOLA ET AL., GREAT EXPECTATIONS—AN ASSESSMENT
OF THE POTENTIAL FOR SUBORBITAL TRANSPORTATION: MASTERS 2008 FINAL REPORT
105 (2008), available at http://isulibrary.isunet.edu/opac/doc_num.php?explnum_id=95
(“From an operator’s perspective, it is nearly inevitable that an accident will occur, and
companies will be sued.”); Paul Bertorelli, Space Tourism: Big Market, Big Risks,
AVWEBINSIDER (Mar. 24, 2012), http://www.avweb.com/blogs/insider/AVWebInsider_
Spacetourism_206368-1.html (“Sooner or later, one of these operators will probably
[suffer a catastrophic accident] and it’s more likely to happen the higher and faster you
fly in untried machines.”).
9 The definition of liability in the context of outer space that Valérie Kayser
adopted from Professor Bin Cheng’s scholarship is instructive: “[L]iability is often used
specifically to denote the obligation to bear the consequences of a breach of a legal duty,
in particular the obligation to make reparations for any damage caused, especially in
the form of monetary payment.” VALÉRIE KAYSER, LAUNCHING SPACE OBJECTS: ISSUES
OF LIABILITY AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 31 (2001) (quoting Bin Cheng, Article VI of the
1967 Space Treaty Revisited: “International Responsibility,” “National Activities,” and
“The Appropriate State”, 26:1 J. SPACE L. 7, 9 (1998) (internal quotations omitted).
10 See, e.g., Blake Gilson, Note, Defending Your Client’s Property Rights in
Space: A Practical Guide for the Lunar Litigator, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1405 (2011)
(arguing that litigation regarding lunar property would be uncertain); see generally
Edward A. Dauer, Apology in the Aftermath of Injury: Colorado’s “I’m Sorry” Law, 34
COLO. LAW. 47 (Apr. 2005) (discussing the upcoming difficulties in advance of a change in
tort law); Bruce W. Foudree, The Year 2000 Problem and the Courts, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y, 515, 515, 527-28 (2000) (discussing the upcoming difficulties in anticipation of
litigation related to the computer failures arising from the Y2K Millennium bug).
11 Several commercial spaceflight companies have announced the prices for their
first passenger flights, all of which cost tens of thousands of dollars. Virgin Galactic charges
$250,000 for its flights. Booking, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/booking/#
reservation_options (last visited Aug. 19, 2013). Space Adventures will charge $110,000 for its
initial flights. Suborbital Spaceflight, SPACE ADVENTURES, http://www.spaceadventures.com/
index.cfm?fuseaction=suborbital.welcome (last visited Aug. 19, 2013). XCOR Aerospace
will charge $95,000 for its initial flights. KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 26.
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and the high net worths of the prospective spaceflight
participants,12 legal action against a private commercial
spaceflight company could result in million-dollar losses,13
which could potentially bankrupt the company.14 Moreover, as
a result of the relatively untested technology and risks
involved,15 safety is a major concern. Indeed, approximately
four percent of all people who have flown in space have
perished.16 According to Virgin Galactic CEO Richard Branson,
“a private program can’t afford to lose anybody.”17
The anticipated problems of private commercial
spaceflight are compounded by a statutory and regulatory regime
that, even before any legal challenges have arisen,18 has been
widely deemed unworkable.19 The existing system is a mishmash
12 Editorial, Space Law: A New Frontier for Commercial Law, METRO. CORP.
COUNS., 35 (Nov. 7 2012), available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/
21106/space-law-new-frontier-commercial-law; see generally James Pearn, Virgin Galactic
Passenger List, J2P2, http://www.j2p2.com/virgin-galactic-passenger-list (last visited Aug.
19, 2013) (listing entrepreneurs, CEOs, and celebrities as among the first passengers).
13 Arthur Piper, The Right Stuff: Barack Obama’s Enthusiasm for Expanding
the Private Sector’s Role in Space Is Timely as Global Regulation Loosens, INT’L B.
NEWS (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=
3ED3E145-68CA-440F-B1B6-DF545BBC65A6.
14 See Leigh Buchanan, Richard Branson: “Screw It. Let’s Do It”, INC. MAG.(
Oct. 31, 2012), available at http://www.inc.com/magazine/201211/leigh-buchanan/siraudacity-richard-branson.html.
15 “Spaceflight is an inherently risky endeavor. Harm can occur at every
stage of flight.” KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 103-04 (detailing instances of death
during the preflight, launch, and reentry phases, and also the possibility for harm to
non-participants). See generally KAYSER, supra note 9, at 5-8.
16 Jeff Foust, Weighing the Risks of Human Spaceflight, SPACE REV. (July 21,
2003), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/36/1. Former astronaut Rick Hauck
explained his methodology for coming to this conclusion during a May 2003 address at
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC: 18 out of
430 people who have flown in space died, including 14 on United States operated Space
Shuttles, and four on Soviet Union operated Soyuz spacecraft. Id. Additionally the
Space Shuttle program has had a “40% vehicular failure rate.” Carol Pinchefsky, 5
Horrifying Facts You Didn’t Know About the Space Shuttle, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/carolpinchefsky/2012/04/18/5-horrifying-facts-you-didntknow-about-the-space-shuttle/ (explaining that two out of the total fleet of five Space
Shuttles suffered fatal destruction).
17 Buchanan, supra note 14.
18 To be sure, lawsuits concerning events that relate to outer space have been
litigated. However, they concerned matters such as the enforceability of liability
waivers in satellite launch malfunction cases. See, e.g., Appalachian Ins. Co. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 1989); Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Int’l Telecommc’ns Satellite Org., 991 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1992). Additionally, courts
issued “opinions that address aerospace activities, among other contexts, in terms of
contract, tort, property, patent, and even tax law.” Timothy M. Ravich, 2010: Space
Law in the Sunshine State, 84 FLA. B.J. 25, 25 (2010) (citations omitted).
19 See,
e.g., GÉRARDINE MEISHAN GOH, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT in
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW: A MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE FOR OUTER SPACE 3, 7
(2007); Frans. G. von der Dunk, Too-Close Encounters of the Third-Party Kind: Will the
Liability Convention Stand the Test of the Cosmos 2251-Iridium 33 Collision?, SPACE &
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of international agreements, federal statutes and regulations, and
state20 laws which combine to form an asynergistic regime that is
simultaneously outdated and untested.21
Accordingly, this note will argue that the current body
of law governing private commercial spaceflight in the United
States is structured in a manner that harms two seemingly
inapposite but coterminous interests: (1) the ability of victims
to recover damages, and (2) the healthy development of the
commercial spaceflight industry. Instead of supporting those
interests, the U.S. space law regime encourages short-term
economic goals that are ultimately self-defeating.
Space law is rooted in a victim-oriented tradition that
dates back to its origins.22 Since then, the United States Congress
has reaffirmed its obligations under international agreements to
uphold those ideals as applied to private commercial spaceflight,23
and high-ranking government officials have expressed their
commitment to minimizing risks to individuals involved in these
activities.24 Nevertheless, Congress, by leaving gaps in federal
law, has constructively pushed states to pass limited liability
statutes, which have the purpose of protecting spaceflight
operators from lawsuits at the expense of potential victims.
This represents, at the minimum, an abrogation of the
longstanding victim-oriented approach that the U.S. pledged to
uphold, and that other States have relied upon. Congress
should pass legislation that removes limited liability.
Additionally, limited liability statutes impair industry
development.25 The commercial spaceflight industry must grow
TELECOMMC’N. L. PROGRAM FAC. PUBLI’NS 199, 200, 205-06 (2010), available at
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/spacelaw/28.
20 N.B. For the purposes of this note, the capitalized “State” refers to nation
states, as traditionally used in the field of international relations. The uncapitalized
“state” refers to one of the fifty federated states of the United States of America.
21 See Ravich, supra note 18, at 32 (“[A]erospace operators will require
counsel to navigate them through the current patchwork of space law, i.e., dated
international treaties, ‘soft law’ resolutions, different state laws, multiple executive
national space policy statements, and conflicting government instructions and
directives.”); see, e.g., von der Dunk, supra note 19, at 200, 205-06; Brian Weeden, 2009
Iridium-Cosmos Collision Fact Sheet, SECURE WORLD FOUND. 2 (Nov. 10, 2010),
available at http://swfound.org/media/6575/2009_iridium-cosmos_factsheet.pdf.
22 See infra Part I.B.
23 See infra Part I.B.2.
24 Subcommittee Examines FY13 FA Office of Commercial Space Transportation
Budget Proposal, COMMITTEE SCI., SPACE, & TECH. (Mar. 20, 2012), http://science.house.gov/
press-release/subcommittee-examines-fy13-faa-office-commercial-space-transportationbudget-proposal (citing statements from House Subcommittee Chairman Steven Palazzo
and testimony from Federal Aviation Administration Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation, Dr. George Nield).
25 See infra Part II.
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beyond its current customer base of very high-net-worth
individuals to realize long-term expansion and profitability.
However, to support that growth, private commercial
spaceflight companies must first create a track record of safe
flights.26 The limited liability model inhibits this process by
discouraging the risk-averse mass-market customer, thereby
restricting the potential client base. This effectively mortgages
the commercial spaceflight industry’s overall development to
further the immediate needs of the space tourism business, which
is a mere subset of the industry.27 As a result, other segments of
private commercial spaceflight—like point-to-point operations,28
which is projected to provide ultra-fast transportation between
any locations on Earth in two hours29—suffer.
Part I of this note gives an overview of the existing law
relevant to private commercial spaceflight, and argues that there
is overwhelming international agreement and a longstanding
policy recognizing that victims of injuries arising from spaceflight
should have mechanisms for recovery. While international law
imposes some restrictions on U.S. policy, it is, on balance, only
a minor factor. The key issue is deficiencies in federal statutes
and regulations that permit states to pass limited liability
laws. Part II argues that Congress should pass legislation
preempting state limited liability statutes to satisfy the dual
goals of preserving the victim-oriented heritage of international
space law, and promoting the healthy and prolonged growth of
the commercial spaceflight industry. In light of the increasing
promulgation of state limited liability statutes, Congress must
act quickly.

See von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 407.
For an overview of the different types of prospective businesses that
encompass the commercial spaceflight industry, see von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 40310 (listing orbital space tourism, suborbital space tourism, suborbital private
spaceflight, hotels in orbit, and private flights to the moon).
28 Point-to-point space transportation involves “climbing to an altitude
outside of most of the atmosphere, maintaining a speed of Mach 5 to Mach 10 for a
period of an hour or more, and then landing at a destination different from the launch
point.” JACKSONVILLE AVIATION AUTHORITY, CECIL SPACEPORT MASTER PLAN (Draft) 1-2
(Mar. 2012), available at http://www.flyjacksonville.com/Cecil/Spaceport/spaceport-mp.pdf.
29 Buchanan, supra note 14.
26
27
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Private commercial spaceflight in the United States is
governed by international, federal, and state law.30 The
overarching field of space law was first institutionally
recognized by the international community in 1958 when the
United Nations General Assembly created the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to address the legal issues in space
activities.31 The United Nations originally formed the Committee
on an ad hoc basis in response to the Soviet Union’s launch of
Sputnik, the first artificial satellite placed into Earth’s orbit,32
and soon converted it into a permanent committee.33 Following
years of negotiations, the Committee recommended, and the
United Nations unanimously voted to adopt, the landmark
Outer Space Declaration of 1963.34 Most of that nonbinding
resolution was formalized shortly thereafter by the ratification
of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967,35 which has been described by
commentators as “the foundation of . . . space law [that] . . . set
the framework and cooperative tone . . . in outer space
activities.”36 This landmark document was well-received by a
30 See generally R. BENDER, SPACE TRANSPORT LIABILITY: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, ch. 15, 279-353 (1995).
31 Vladimir Kopal, The Role of United Nations Declarations of Principles in
the Progressive Development of Space Law, 16 J. SPACE L. 5, 5-6 (1988).
32 Brian Wessel, The Rule of Law in Outer Space: The Effects of Treaties and
Nonbinding Agreements on International Space Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 289, 290-91 (2012).
33 P.P.C. HAANAPPEL, THE LAW AND POLICY OF AIR SPACE AND OUTER SPACE:
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 8 n.43 (2003).
34 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No.
15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (Dec. 13, 1963), available at http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/
SpaceLaw/lpos.html; see Kopal, supra note 31, at 6-7 (“[T]he first legislative act . . . in
the field of space law emerged as the 1963 Declaration . . . .”); see generally UNITED
NATIONS TREATIES AND PRINCIPLES ON OUTER SPACE AND RELATED GENERAL
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS v-vi (2002), available at http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/
pdf/publications/st_space_11rev2E.pdf. Several other events predate the Outer Space
Declaration of 1963, which was the product of years of international cooperation. For a
brief discussion on the work done by non-governmental organizations other than the
United Nations, see Kopal, supra note 31, at n.6.
35 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967,
18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty], reprinted in
UNITED NATIONS TREATIES AND PRINCIPLES ON OUTER SPACE 3-8, supra note 34 .
36 THOMAS GANGALE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUTER SPACE: SOVEREIGNTY AND
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 50 (2009) (quoting the U.S. advisor to
the United Nations Kenneth Hodgkins).
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majority of the world, having been ratified by 101 States.37
Indeed, the Outer Space Treaty is so widely accepted that it is
part of customary international law,38 and may therefore apply
even to countries that are not signatories.39 Accordingly, the
“international community gives great weight to the commitments
under the treaty and expects States to adhere to them.”40
But by 1979, the “original euphoria”41 that fed the early
development in the field had been “exhaust[ed],”42 and no
additional space law treaties have come into force since.43
Indeed, the last of these treaties, the Moon Agreement,44 has
only been ratified by 13 States, none of which are major space
powers.45 Accordingly, although the Moon Agreement “has
frequently featured prominently in debates on international
Wessel, supra note 32, at 292.
“Customary international law [CIL] results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987). The “conventional wisdom” is that
customary international law “bind[s] nations with the same force as treaties.” Jack L.
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 1 (Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 63 4 1998), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
files/files/63.Goldsmith-Posner.pdf. Moreover, “[g]overnments take care to comply with
CIL, . . . [n]ational courts apply CIL as a rule of decision, . . . [n]ations argue about
whether certain acts violate CIL[, and] [v]iolations of CIL are grounds for war or an
international claim.” Id. at 1.
39 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 58; Wessel, supra note 32, at 297; see
Andrei D. Terekhov, UN General Assembly Resolutions and Outer Space Law,
Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 97, 103 (1997), reprinted in
SPACE LAW (Francis Lyall and Paul B. Laren eds., 2007).
40 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 61.
41 Kopal, supra note 31, at 20.
42 Id.
43 See Timothy G. Nelson, The Moon Agreement and Private Enterprise: Lessons
from Investment Law, 17 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 394 (2011). Between 1967 and
1979, United Nations member states ratified five treaties regarding outer space:
37
38

Among the five core treaties adopted by the United Nations at the outset of
the era of human spaceflight are the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S.
205; Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by Space
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187; Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched
into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119;
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 14,
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 187; and Agreement Governing the
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979,
1363 U.S.T. 3.
Ravich, supra note 18, at 32 n.1 (citations omitted); see also Wessel, supra note 32, at
292-94.
44 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.S.T. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement], reprinted in
UNITED NATIONS TREATIES AND PRINCIPLES ON OUTER SPACE 27-35, supra note 34 .
45 Wessel, supra note 32, at 293.
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space law, it has not had a large practical impact”46 and is now
considered to be “dormant.”47
Following that period of progress, the United Nations
General Assembly, in the absence of any meaningful
international support for additional treaties,48 returned to
passing declarations of principles.49 These declarations operate
as “the first stage in the lawmaking process, serving as a basis
for negotiating international agreements on the given subjects,
and as an initial formulation of future provisions of the
respective treaties.”50 They are not binding “and do not create
norms of international law.”51 Nevertheless, those declarations
are “generally followed by spacefaring nations and may have
attained the status of customary international law, although
this has not been tested judicially.”52 In all, there have been
five declarations, the last of which was passed in 1996.53
In 1984, the United States Congress, recognizing the
need for “promoting the commercial space sector,”54 began
“developing a framework for commercial space transportation.”55
The federal legislative and regulatory system is incomplete,56
however, and the five states most directly impacted by
spaceflight have passed limited liability laws in order to fill
gaps in the national structure.57 The last major holdout,
California, finally relented in 2012.58 Today, almost every state
Id. at 293-94.
KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at xviii.
48 See P.J. Blount, Renovating Space: The Future of International Space Law,
40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 515, 524 (2012).
49 Wessel, supra note 32, at 294.
50 Kopal, supra note 31, at 19.
51 Terekhov, supra note 39, at 97.
52 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 67.
53 See generally Terekhov, supra note 39, at 98-102. The five declarations,
aside from the Outer Space Declaration of 1963, are Principles Governing the Use by
States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting,
U.N. Res. 37/92 (Dec. 10, 1982); Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth
from Outer Space, U.N. Res. 41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986); Principles Relevant to the Use of
Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, U.N. Res. 47/68 (Dec. 14, 1992); and
Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space
for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the
Needs of Developing Countries U.N. Res. 51/122 (Dec. 13 1996).
54 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 76.
55 Id.
56 Federal legislation does not address whether spaceflight companies are
liable to flight crews, spaceflight participants or their heirs. Accordingly, those issues
“must instead be addressed by [s]tate law . . . .” KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 107.
57 Those states—Virginia, Florida, New Mexico, Texas, and California—
either have institutional ties to government-sponsored spaceflight, or have attracted
investment from the private commercial spaceflight industry. See infra Part I.C.
58 See Assemb. B. 2243, Ch. 416 (Cal. 2012); Joe Weichman, Remaining
Competitive: Extending Spaceflight Protections 10 (May 2013), available at
46
47
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with a strong interest in the development of commercial
spaceflight has passed legislation on the matter.59
B.

International Law Foundations for the Victim-Oriented
Approach of Commercial Spaceflight
1. The Outer Space Treaty60

Referred to as a “constitution for outer space” by some
commentators,61 the Outer Space Treaty was never truly
intended to address commercial activity.62 It is well supported
that the drafters were principally concerned with matters of
global security, including the “prevention of the arms race in
outer space.”63 Given the highly contentious nature of the Cold
War era, it should come as no surprise that avoiding war took
precedence.64 Nevertheless, commercial activity was “to a small
extent envisioned . . . [and] [t]he idea of private actors was not
completely ignored.”65 To that point, Article VI of the Outer
Space Treaty provides in pertinent part that:
Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for
national activities in outer space . . . whether such activities are
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental
entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in
conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The
activities of non-governmental entities in outer space . . . shall
require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate
State Party to the Treaty.66

Additionally, Article VII of the treaty provides that:

http://www.makingitincalifornia.com/documents/Remaining%20Competitive%20%20Extending%20Spaceflight%20Protections.pdf.
59 See generally KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 107-10; Leonard David,
Private Space Travel Gets a Big Boost in California, SPACE.COM (Sept. 21, 2012),
http://www.space.com/17720-private-spaceflight-liability-california-law.html.
60 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35.
61 Wessel, supra note 32, at 292 (quoting Helmet Tuerk, The Negotiation of
the “Moon Agreement”, 52 PROC. COLLOQUIUM ON LAW OUTER SPACE 491, 493 (2010)).
But see Ivan A. Vlasic, The Space Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation, 55 CAL. L. REV.
507, 508 (1967) (“The result is a document which expresses general principles in
diverse areas but breaks very little new ground. It leaves unsolved a number of
problems which urgently need legal regulation.”).
62 See generally Vlasic, supra note 61. It was meant to codify the Outer Space
Declaration, which also did not concern private activity. KAYSER, supra note 9, at 37.
63 Vlasic, supra note 61, at 512; see, e.g., Blount, supra note 48, at 517-18.
64 Ravich, supra note 18, at 26.
65 Blount, supra note 48, at 518.
66 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. VI.
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Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space . . . and each State Party from
whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally
liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its
natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on
the Earth, in air space or in outer space . . . 67

Remarkably, signatories of the treaty agreed to be
responsible and liable68 for the actions of private actors under
their governance for their space activities.69 Accordingly,
Articles VI and VII serve to promote governmental regulation
of private action because of, among other things, the risk of
derivative liability.70 Given the high expense of spaceflight at
the time,71 however, it was virtually unimaginable that any
Id. art. VII (emphasis added).
For an explanation of the difference between “responsibility” and
“liability,” see KAYSER, supra note 9, at 31 (quoting Bin Cheng, Article VI of the 1967
Space Treaty Revisited: “International Responsibility,” “National Activities,” and “The
Appropriate State”, 26:1 J. SPACE L. 7, 9 (1998) (“‘Responsibility means
essentially . . . answerability for one’s acts and omissions, . . . for their
consequences, . . . for compliance with his or her legal duties, and for any breaches
thereof . . . . [L]iability is . . . the obligation to bear the consequences of a breach of a
legal duty, in particular the obligation to make reparation for any damage caused,
especially in the form of a monetary payment.’”)). Professor Peter P.C. Haanappel
analyzes the terms in the following manner:
67
68

The English text of space law treaties and other texts uses the terms
“responsibility” and “liability,” and the corresponding adjectives “responsible”
and “liable.” Other languages, especially the Latin ones (such as French and
Spanish) only have one term, from the same source as the English
“responsibility.” It is submitted that where, taking English as a guideline,
“responsibility” or “responsible” is used, this essentially means “to have a
duty” (the debitum from Roman law); where “liability” or “liable” is used, this
essentially means ‘to have an obligation to repair, to pay damanges (the
obligatio from Roman law).
HAANAPPEL, supra note 33, at 8 n.48. Other scholars note that “[t]he term
‘responsibility’ has been variously defined, sometimes equated with and sometimes
distinguished from the term ‘liability.’” BENDER, supra note 30, at 282.
69 Blount, supra note 48, at 518.
70 See
Benjamin Perlman, Note, Grounding U.S. Commercial Space
Regulation in the Constitution, 100 GEO L.J. 929, 934 (2012); see also Zhao Yun, A
Legal Regime for Space Tourism: Creating Legal Certainty in Outer Space, 74 J. AIR L.
& COM. 959 (2009).
71 Claude Lafleur, Costs of US Piloted Programs, SPACE REV. (Mar. 8, 2010),
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1579/1. NASA’s Mercury program, which
operated six flights from 1959 to 1963, cost the equivalent of $2.1 billion in 2013
dollars, which equals $342.8 million per flight. Id. NASA’s Gemini program, which
operated ten flights from 1962 to 1967, cost $9.1 billion in 2013 dollars, which equals
$910.3 million per flight. Id. NASA’s Apollo program, which operated eleven flights
from 1959 to 1973, cost $107.5 billion in 2013 dollars, which equals $9.8 billion per
flight. Id. Finally NASA’s Space Shuttle program, which operated 134 flights from 1972
to 2012, cost $198.6 billion in 2010 dollars, which equals $1.4 billion per flight. Id. All
preceding 2013 dollar amounts were calculated using the US Inflation Calculator, a
website that “uses the latest US government CPI [consumer price index] data
published on Sept. 17, 2013 to adjust for inflation and calculate the cumulative
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non-governmental entity could participate in space activity, at
least for the foreseeable future. Lack of technical expertise
notwithstanding, the average cost per flight in 1967, over $600
million, would have been unaffordable.72
While the treaty laid the groundwork for commercial
space activity, there was no realistic possibility for that
industry to emerge in the foreseeable future.73 Accordingly, the
drafters had no reason to seriously consider addressing issues
related to commercial spaceflight.74 Instead, the Outer Space
Treaty should be understood to provide only general principles
for subsequent lawmakers to rely and build upon.75 Most
notably, the treaty does not address the key issues of
enforceability and dispute resolution.76
2. Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects of 1972 (Liability
Convention)77
The Liability Convention is an extension of Articles VI
and VII of the Outer Space Treaty.78 As the five-year gap
between the two treaties suggests, coming to an agreement
regarding the specific legal issues addressed by the Liability
Convention was a deliberate affair that required accounting for
the differences among the drafters’ legal systems.79 There was a
general consensus that the treaty was essential,80 but the

inflation rate.” US INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com (last
visited Oct. 6, 2013). During this time, cost was not an issue because the space program
was viewed as a means to garner public support for the United States during the Cold
War against the Soviet Union. Michio Kaku, The Cost of Space Exploration, FORBES
(July 16, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/16/apollo-moon-landing-anniversaryopinions-contributors-cost-money.html.
72 The average price for the Mercury flights was $342.8 million, and the
average price for the Gemini flights was $910.3 million, which, if averaged, gives an
average flight cost of $626.6 million. See supra note 71.
73 GOH, supra note 19, at 163.
74 See Blount, supra note 48, at 518.
75 See BRUCE A. HURWITZ, STATE LIABILITY FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE 1972 CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE
CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS 9 (1992).
76 GOH, supra note 19, at 29.
77 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, Mar. 29 1972 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability
Convention], reprinted in UNITED NATIONS TREATIES AND PRINCIPLES ON OUTER SPACE
13-21, supra note 34 .
78 Liability Convention, supra note 77; see also KAYSER, supra note 9, at 33;
HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 9.
79 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 33.
80 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 13.
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necessary detailed legal work81 precluded a repeat of the speedy
drafting process of the Outer Space Treaty.82 And although the
spacefaring nations clearly had an interest in the matter, nonspace powers were also eager to bring about an agreement that
would protect them in the event of accidents they believed were
certain to arise.83 The final product reflected those concerns,
and supports the view that the Liability Convention is “victim
oriented.”84 Therefore, by ratifying the Convention, the United
States implicitly recognized that activities in outer space, while
important, are dangerous and must provide injured parties
with a means for compensation.85
To accomplish its framers’ victim-oriented goals, the
Liability Convention sets forth a regime to govern liability for
damage inflicted during space activities.86 The drafters
expanded upon the Outer Space Treaty by clarifying formerly
uncertain terms and ideas.87 Also, the Convention provides
parties with a mechanism to adjudicate disputes and grant
relief.88 Although it is arguable that the Liability Convention’s
additions to the Outer Space Treaty have thus far not resulted in
tangible, or even theoretical, benefits for victims,89 it nevertheless
still represents the international community’s collective intent to
“restore injured parties to their pre-accident condition.”90
a. Damages
Article I of the Liability Convention defines damages—a
previously undefined term in space law—as the “loss of life,
personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or
damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical,
or property of international intergovernmental organizations.”91
In regard to personal injuries, Article I encapsulates both
See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 33.
See Vlasic, supra note 61, at 507.
83 See HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 10.
84 Id. at 9-10.
85 See generally id. at 10-11 (discussing the compensation scheme developed);
see also KAYSER, supra note 9, at 47-52 (discussing the agreement among the
international community that victims are entitled to means for recovery in incidents
related to outer space activities).
86 Liability Convention, supra note 77; see also HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 910; KAYSER, supra note 9, at 33.
87 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 33.
88 Liability Convention, supra note 77.
89 See, e.g., GOH, supra note 19, at 2-3; von der Dunk, supra note 19, at 200,
205-06.
90 BENDER, supra note 30, at 313.
91 Liability Convention, supra note 77.
81
82
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direct damages—physical injuries and illnesses—and also
indirect damages, such as lost wages, pain and suffering, and
humiliation.92 While the treaty text does not explicitly include
indirect damages in its definition of damages, most scholars
agree that victims can recover for them.93 Indeed, allowing for
recovery of indirect damages would comport with both the victimoriented heritage of outer space law,94 and also with other, similar
international law.95 No similar debate exists regarding the
comparatively straightforward area of both direct and indirect
property damage.96
b. Liability
Next, the Convention addresses liability in several
places. Article II provides that “[a] launching State shall be
absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its
space object on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight.”97
Article I, Section C defines launching State in four ways:
(1) “[a] State which launches . . . a space object;”98
(2) “[a] State which . . . procures the launching of a space object;”99
(3) “[a] State from whose territory . . . a space object is launched;”100
and
(4) “[a] State from whose . . . facility a space object is launched.”101

Additionally, “[t]he term ‘launching’ includes attempted
launching.”102 Read together with Article VI of the Outer Space
Treaty, under Article II of the Liability Convention, a
See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 47-49.
See, e.g., HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 13-16 (concluding that the Liability
Convention governs indirect damages based upon analysis of legislative history and
analogous international agreements); KAYSER, supra note 9, at 49-50 (arguing that the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties supports inclusion of indirect damages). But
cf. BENDER, supra note 30, at 301-02 (arguing that “[a] knowledgeable United States
commentator is . . . on record as stating the Liability Convention does not permit . . .
indirect damages” and that international law generally allows for narrower recovery).
94 See HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 14-16.
95 See id. at 16-18 (cataloguing recognition of indirect damages in areas such
as air law and nuclear energy law).
96 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 47-49.
97 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. II.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. This note will refer to those four definitions as being part of the launch,
procurement, territory, and facility clauses, respectively.
102 Id. But this more expansive definition of launching may not survive a more
probing analysis. For a detailed look at the potential inadequacy of the definition, see
HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 20-21.
92
93

304

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1

government is both internationally responsible and strictly
liable for damages inflicted below Earth’s orbit103 by a private
actor, such as a private commercial spaceflight company, so
long as that government qualifies as a launching State.104
While Article I, Section C makes it clear that a State is
responsible for its own activities in space, when it comes to
determining who is liable for damages arising out of private
commercial spaceflight, the “launching State” designation can
become a source of controversy.105 It is uncertain what private
actions will trigger State liability under the procurement,
territory, and facility clauses of Article I, Section C.106
For instance, an expansive reading of the procurement
clause would find that there is State liability even when its
“nationals have [merely] financed or ordered the launching.”107
Under this scenario, a private actor could be making his or her
State liable “against its will.”108 Alternatively, it may be argued
that no State “procures the launching” when a private company
contracts with another private company for a space launch, but
without any government involvement.109
This issue also arises under the facility clause because
of the advent of privately-owned spaceports,110 which calls into
question whether they may legally be designated as State
facilities.111 It is more settled, on the other hand, that when the
facility is State-owned, liability is proper whether it is located
in “foreign countries . . . outer space, on the high seas or the

See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35; Liability Convention, supra note 77.
von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 410.
105 See id. at 410-11.
106 Id.
107 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 22.
108 Id.
109 See von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 411.
110 “A spaceport is the infrastructure at either the origin or destination of a
spaceflight. It provides the essential infrastructure and related ground processing
operations needed for space access as well as the facilities, organizations, and
operations required to safely manage spaceflight.” ADVANCED SPACEPORT
TECHNOLOGIES WORKING GROUP, BASELINE REPORT: CHARTING AMERICA’S PATH
TOWARDS LOW-COST, ROUTINE ACCESS TO SPACE vii (Nov. 2003), available at
http://weboflife.nasa.gov/shuttle/nexgen/Nexgen_Downloads/ASTWG/. “Many states
have developed or are developing commercial spaceports, including New Mexico,
Florida, Texas, Oklahoma, Virginia, Alaska, Colorado and California.” Partnerships to
Advance the Business of Space: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, Subcommittee, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (testimony of Capt.
Michael Lopez-Algeria), available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=
Files.Serve&File_id=18d37b64-c839-46f0-a443-aebf6e47c009.
111 See von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 411.
103
104
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ocean floor, or in other territories outside the national
jurisdiction of any State.”112
Finally, the territory clause is relevant in regard to
assigning liability for launches that occur in territories outside
any jurisdiction, such as international waters.113 It is uncertain
how the Liability Convention would apply to this type of launch
because “[h]aving ‘territory’ in the international legal sense of
the word is exclusively reserved for [S]tates.”114 In sum, as a
result of the uncertainties arising from the launching State
designation, it would be reasonable for “concerned [S]tates to
exercise their national jurisdiction to control private
spaceflight in an effort to guard against liability and any
obligation to pay for the damage caused.”115
Under the victim-oriented perspective of the
Convention, the advantage of having these four definitions is
clear: it gives an injured party more options for recovery.116
Articles IV and V advance this objective by providing for joint and
several liability for States that jointly launch a space object.117
Moreover, Article V forecloses potential loopholes by declaring
that “[a] State from whose territory or facility a space object is
launched shall be regarded as a participant in a joint
launching.”118 Accordingly, a State that permits use of its territory
or facilities cannot escape liability under the Convention.119
Additionally, the strict liability regime is justified on the
grounds that the resulting damage will likely concern causes of
action that are difficult to prove under a traditional negligence
theory.120 Despite huge advances in the field, private commercial
spaceflight is still in its infancy and dangerous, and the
technologies involved are “shrouded in a web of secrecy.”121 The
HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 22.
See von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 411. Sea Launch is a private company
that provides heavy lift launch services for commercial customers via Odyssey, a
refurbished former oil drilling platform on the Pacific Ocean that now operates as a
launch platform. Launch Platform Odyssey, SEA LAUNCH, http://www.sealaunch.com/launch-q11142-Launch_Platform_iOdysseyi.aspx (last visited Aug. 19,
2013). The company conducts launches from its Pacific Ocean location on the equator to
take advantage of Earth’s increased rotation speed at its center, thereby increasing the
amount of payload a satellite can carry. Justin Ray, Sea Launch Rocket Lofts TV Satellite
Into Orbit, SPACE.COM (Aug. 19, 2012), http://www.space.com/17178-sea-launch-rocketsatellite-success.html.
114 See von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 411 & n.42.
115 Id. at 411.
116 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 22.
117 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. IV.
118 Id. art. V.
119 See id.
120 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 50-51.
121 See HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 28.
112
113
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implications of this are two-fold. First, because injured parties
will likely be unable to obtain the secret information, they will
encounter unjustly burdensome difficulties in proving an
otherwise meritorious case.122 Second, the industry is still
untested, and there exists neither adequate legislative clarity
nor jurisprudence to provide guidance to litigants regarding
how to succeed in an outer space negligence suit.123 In sum,
[strict] liability shows the maturity of society . . . [It] shows that
society recognizes the benefits of technology and the fact that it
cannot be regulated due to the many unknown dimensions involved
with its development and exploitation. Yet, the overriding
importance of the technology for society means that development
must continue and therefore the danger is accepted under the
condition that (a) the danger will, with time, fall to an acceptable
(normal) level, and (b) until that time, the operator of the technology
will be liable to pay compensation for damage caused by such a
technology without the victim having to prove negligence.124

In the end, the drafters determined that strict liability
was appropriate given the danger involved both on Earth and
in outer space.125
In addition to supporting the imposition of strict
liability, the dangerous nature of space activities also justifies
the Convention not capping compensation recoverable against
a launching State.126 To be sure, the negotiating States did
consider a limit on compensation, but could not settle on an
amount that was “sufficiently high to ensure that the victim
would be fully compensated.”127
Nevertheless, Article VI provides exceptions to strict
liability in two limited situations.128 First, exoneration from
strict liability may apply if the injured party acted with “gross
negligence.”129 Second, if the injured party, “with intent to cause
damage,” acted or failed to act, then exoneration may apply.130 In
essence, this shifts the system to one that is more akin to fault
liability.131 However, a launching State that failed to comport

See id. at 29.
See id.; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
124 See HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 36 (alteration in original).
125 Id. at 28-29.
126 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 51.
127 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 56 (quoting 1969 U.N.Y.B 47) (discussing the
expressions of the Argentina, Iran, and Lebanon delegations to the united nations).
128 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. VI.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 41.
122
123
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with relevant international law may be precluded from
exercising that exemption.132
The liability scheme also changes to common-law fault
liability when damage is caused by one space object to another
when both are in outer space.133 Article III of the Liability
Convention provides that:
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface
of the Earth to a space object of one launching State or to persons or
property on board such a space object by a space object of another
launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due
to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible.134

Because the drafters were predominantly concerned
with non-commercial spaceflight,135 they intended for Article III
to apply only to “a collision between space objects in outer
space.”136 Moreover, the desire to protect victims that is
expressed in other parts of the Convention137 is absent in
Article III, which operates on the theory that all parties able to
achieve spaceflight are sufficiently sophisticated to overcome the
hurdles that impact non-space-faring parties.138 Additionally,
they “have assumed the risks of conducting these activities: none
should be a privileged victim.”139 Nevertheless, the launching
State is still liable for the damages caused by those “persons for
whom it is responsible.”140 Although that term is not explicitly
defined,141 it may be inferred that certain parties who fall within
the definitions set forth in Article I, Section C qualify.142 This
means that even for damages caused by non-government actors in
orbit and beyond, the State may be liable, albeit not absolutely.143
Additionally, States can find some relief from liability in
Article VII, which bars some individuals from bringing a claim
under the Liability Convention.144 Specifically the Convention
does not apply to “[f]oreign nationals during such time as they
are participating in the operation of that space object . . . or
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. VI.
See id. art. III. See supra note 3 (delineating when an object is in outer space).
Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. III.
See id.; GOH, supra note 19, at 163.
HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 32-33.
See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
See HURWITZ supra note 75, at 34.
See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 51.
Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. III.
HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 35.
See id.; Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. I(c).
Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. II-IV.
Id. art. VII.
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during such time as they are in the immediate vicinity of a
planned launching or recovery area as the result of an
invitation by that launching State.”145 The drafters’ reasoning
for this carve-out follows their Article III logic that a
consenting party should not be given privileged victim status.146
However, even in this situation, questions regarding the
Convention’s applicability may arise in cases where foreign
tourists become injured during a spaceport visit to observe launch
activities.147 Given the trend toward making spaceports major
tourist destinations,148 this could be a void in the international
law field.149 In that situation, foreign nationals may simply bring
suit outside of the provisions of the Liability Convention.150
c. Dispute Resolution and Recovery
The Liability Convention does not allow for a private
cause of action.151 Instead, under Article VIII, the right to bring
claims is exclusive to “[a] State which suffers damage, or whose
natural or juridical persons suffer damage.”152 This means that
in any incident, up to three States may have a cause of action: “the
State where injury or damage occurs, the State of nationality of the
individual victim(s), and the State of permanent residence of the
individual victim(s).”153 Under this system, a hierarchy of
decreasing priority prevents overlapping claims.154 Accordingly, the
“[s]econd and third ranked States cannot present claims unless the
preceding State chooses not to exercise its right to do so.”155
Moreover, the claim must be presented to “a launching State.”156
For a private spaceflight company, one of the most
constraining aspects of the Liability Convention’s claim process
is that it must rely on a State to bring a claim, or petition the
State to act.157 Worse still is that the only proper target of a suit
Id. art. VII.
HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 44-46.
147 Id.
148 See Jesse McKinley, Spaceport America Eyes the (Near) Future, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 7, 2012), http://travel.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/travel/spaceport-america-eyes-thenear-future.html (“[O]fficials say they expect to draw as many as 200,000 visitors a
year to see the spaceport.”).
149 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 44.
150 Id.
151 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. VIII; von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 413.
152 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. VIII.
153 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 49.
154 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. VIII.
155 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 49.
156 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. VIII.
157 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 52-53; HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 50.
145
146
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under this system is another State.158 Outside those options,
the private spaceflight company has “neither any recourse nor
accountability under the . . . Convention.”159 Further, because of
the required involvement of State actors, the decision to bring suit
is an inherently political decision with potential diplomatic
ramifications.160 In fact, Article IX requires that claims be
“presented to a launching State through diplomatic channels.”161
The State action requirement is exacerbated by the one-year
statute of limitations set forth in Article X.162 Although a time limit
on the presentment of claims is not per se unreasonable,163 it
certainly qualifies as a source of uncertainty for the private actor.164
Even if the private company is able to persuade its
government to bring a claim, the procedures set forth by the
Convention are unwieldy and untested.165 Article XIV states
that the dispute will be settled by a Claims Commission,166 a
three-member, ad hoc, quasi-judicial body whose decisions are
only “final and binding if the parties have so agreed.”167 Absent
such an agreement, a decision is merely advisory.168
Additionally, the Liability Convention does not provide for any
meaningful procedural rules.169 Instead, Article XVI only directs
that “the Commission shall determine its own procedure,”170 and
that it “shall determine the place or places it shall sit and all
other administrative matters.”171 Furthermore, if the suit is
successful, there is no explicit requirement for the State to
transfer its award to a victim.172 As a testament to the drafters’
own uncertainty over whether States would adopt the claims
Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. II-V.
Yun, supra note 70, at 966.
160 See HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 50-51.
161 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. IX (emphasis added).
162 Id. art. X.
163 See GOH, supra note 19, at 37.
164 Id.
165 To date, no claims have been fully adjudicated via the Claims Commission
procedures of the Liability Convention. Weeden, supra note 21, at 2. In fact, the 2009
collision between a U.S. satellite, the Iridium 33, and a Russian satellite, the Cosmos
2251, which seemed to present a storybook opportunity to test the Liability
Convention, had its one-year statute of limitation under the Liability Convention pass
without any party bringing a claim. Id.
166 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. XIV.
167 Id. art. XIX. As the Brazilian delegation to the United Nations astutely
observed, “it was doubtful that a provision in any convention would become binding
merely because it was said to be binding.” HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 59.
168 GOH, supra note 19, at 38.
169 Liability Convention, supra note 77.
170 Id. art. XVI.
171 Id.
172 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 50.
158
159
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procedures, Article XI does “not require the prior exhaustion of
any local remedies,” nor does it “prevent a State, or natural or
juridical persons it might represent, from pursuing a claim in
the courts or administrative tribunals or agencies of a
launching State.”173
3. The International Community’s Collective Intent
The Outer Space Treaty and Liability Convention, read
in conjunction, illustrate a major tenet of existing international
space law that must translate into commercial space law as
well: the State has obligations to uphold, including maintaining
the victim-oriented system that it has supported for decades.174
As applied to commercial spaceflight, that means a State should,
at a minimum, recognize the fault liability regime, if not a strict
liability regime, and also the possibility of recovery for indirect
damages.175 Additionally, as the lack of use and the confusing
rules of the Liability Convention’s claims process make clear,
that portion of the treaty’s relevance in the commercial realm is
questionable.176 Accordingly, it is proper for the State to take a
more direct approach in regard to adjudicating disputes,177
while still adhering to the victim-oriented tradition established
in international law.
C.

United States Federal Law Continues the VictimOriented Tradition
1. Commercial Space Launch Act (Launch Act)178

Prior to 1984, no agency was explicitly authorized to
regulate private commercial spaceflight.179 The example of
Space Services, Inc. is instructive. In its successful efforts to
achieve the first launch of a space object by an American
company without direct government participation, Space
Services negotiated with over a dozen federal agencies over a
Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. XI.
See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 33; HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 9-10.
175 See BENDER, supra note 30, at 313-14.
176 See von der Dunk, supra note 19, at 200, 205-06.
177 See von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 411 (“[C]oncerned [S]tates [should]
exercise their national jurisdiction to control private spaceflight in an effort to guard
against liability and any obligation to pay for damage caused.”).
178 Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055 (1984)
(codified as amended at 51 U.S.C. §§ 50901-50923 (2012)).
179 KAYSER, supra note 9, at 79.
173
174
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period of six months180 to gain government approval.181 Among
other agencies, NASA, the Coast Guard, Central Intelligence
Agency, Department of Defense, Department of State, Federal
Aviation Administration, Federal Communications Commission,
and Internal Revenue Service all had a hand in regulating a
private launch.182 The process was slow, unpredictable,
expensive, and not conducive to smooth business operation.183
Accordingly, Congress passed the Launch Act in 1984 to
promote the commercial spaceflight industry.184 Additionally, it
sought to simultaneously develop a system to protect the
public, principally via the licensing of spaceflight operators.185
Moreover, Congress intended to create a favorable climate for
private actors by dramatically cutting down on bureaucratic
hurdles and centralizing all authority to regulating the commercial
spaceflight industry to the Secretary of Transportation.186 To that
end, Congress granted the Secretary of Transportation oversight of
the recently created Office of Commercial Space Transportation187
and control over licensing agreements with private actors.188
Nevertheless, the Secretary must act in a manner that is
“consistent with any obligation assumed by the United States
in any treaty, convention, or agreement that may be in force
between the United States and any foreign nation.”189
Congress subsequently amended the Launch Act in
1988 to reflect “the necessity [of compensating] individuals for
damages incurred in the course of space exploration.”190 Under
the updated statute, there is a three-tier risk allocation
structure191 that creates a guaranteed government fund in the
event that private insurance is insufficient to cover all of the
damages.192 In the first tier, a private spaceflight operator is
Id. at 80-84.
Barton E. Showalter, Comment, In Space, Nobody Can Hear You Scream
“Tort!”, 58 J. AIR L. & COM. 795, 803 (1993).
182 KAYSER, supra note 9, at 80-84.
183 See id. at 85-90.
184 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 76 (2012).
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 See Anthony R. Filiato, Note, The Commercial Space Launch Act:
America’s Response to the Moon Treaty?, 10 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 763, 773-74 (1987).
188 51 U.S.C. § 50909 (2012).
189 Id. § 50921(d).
190 Lauren S. B. Bornemann, This is Ground Control to Major Tom . . . Your
Wife Would Like to Sue But There’s Nothing We Can Do . . . . The Unlikelihood that the
FTCA Waives Sovereign Immunity for Torts Committed by United States Employees in
Outer Space: A Call for Preemptive Legislation, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 517, 531-32 (1998).
191 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 105-06.
192 Bornemann, supra note 190, at 531.
180
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liable up to its maximum probable loss, a case-by-case
determination “capped at $500 million in 1988 dollars [that is]
adjusted for inflation.”193 Compensation in excess of the
maximum probable loss is governed by the second tier, which is
paid through a public fund maintained by the federal
government.194 Under the third tier, once liability exceeds $2
billion in 1988 dollars, the private actor is again responsible for
payment.195 In doing so, Congress effectively protects private
actors from unlimited liability via its allocation of up to $1.5
billion toward damages.196
This addresses one of the chief criticisms of the Liability
Convention—the lack of a cap on compensation—although the
State is still subject to unlimited liability.197 By agreeing to the
creation of the second tier of repayment, however, “[t]he United
States has . . . committed itself to pay for negligence claims to
which it was not even a party.”198 This practice comports with
the victim-oriented view of space law originally espoused by the
Liability Convention, and represents a tacit agreement to its
ideals by the United States Congress while still promoting
private development. Indeed, “[i]n the interconnected world of
the twenty-first century, the ‘one-nation-go-it-alone’ model . . . is
becoming increasingly anachronistic.”199
2. Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004
(CSLAA)200
Congress’s passage of the Commercial Space Launch
Amendments Act of 2004201 signaled to aerospace companies
that the federal government supported the efforts of the private
sector to carry passengers into space.202 Specifically, the CSLAA
KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 105.
Id. at 106.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 51.
198 Bornemann, supra note 190, at 532.
199 Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, One Half Century and Counting: The Evolution
of U.S. National Space Law and Three Long-Term Emerging Issues, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 405, 426 (2010).
200 Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-492,
118 Stat. 3974 (2004) (codified at 51 U.S.C. §§ 70101-21 (2011)).
201 Id.
202 See National Space Policy of the United States of America (June 28, 2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-2810.pdf (recognizing that “a robust and competitive commercial space sector is vital . . . .
The United States is committed to encouraging and facilitating the growth of a U.S.
commercial space sector.”).
193
194
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“authorized private individuals to pay for, and commercial
space entities to provide, space travel.”203
The CSLAA imposes only minimal requirements on
space flight participants,204 the most important of which,
arguably, is that they give “written informed consent.”205 The
CSLAA’s requirement for informed consent is a logical
extension of the Launch Act’s licensing scheme in that both
operate as preventative measures that attempt to improve
safety.206 Because of the multitude of risks associated with
space travel,207 it is reasonable to assume that the required
waivers will be exceedingly comprehensive and cautiously
drafted to avoid liability.208 Indeed, some spaceflight operators
will go to extreme lengths to demonstrate the validity of
waivers. For example, Space Adventures, the “first and only
company”209 to have sent non-astronauts into space, explicitly
includes a “waiver signing ceremony” in its default suborbital
spaceflight itinerary.210
3. The U.S. Congress’s Failure to Act
The Launch Act and CSLAA continue where the Outer
Space Treaty and the Liability Convention leave off by
addressing unresolved issues in commercial spaceflight and
liability. Additionally, Congress crafted legislation that maintains
the spirit of those two treaties by providing for a fund that
supplements the insurance requirements while simultaneously
KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 80.
See id. at 95-97.
205 51 U.S.C. § 70102(c)(13)(c). Though not explicitly regulated by statute, an
area of increasing relevance is whether the FAA’s hands-off approach regarding
passenger fitness to fly is adequate, because the current rules leave the “medical
screening process up to the commercial space vehicle operators.” Julielynn Wong, Doc,
Am I Fit to Fly Into Space?, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
singularity/2013/01/10/doc-am-i-fit-to-fly-into-space/.
206 51 U.S.C. § 70102(a)(12)-(15)
207 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
208 See, e.g., Pamela L. Meredith & Marshall M. Lammers, Commercial
Spaceflight: The “Ticket to Ride”, 25 No.1 AIR & SPACE LAW. 4 & n.56 (2012) (citing
N.M. Laws 8, § 4 as a sample exculpatory clause: “WARNING AND
ACKNOWLEDGMENT: I understand and acknowledge that under New Mexico law,
there is no liability for injury to or death sustained by a participant in a space flight
activity provided by a space flight entity if the injury or death results from the inherent
risks of the space flight activity . . . .”).
209 About
Us, SPACE ADVENTURES, http://www.spaceadventures.com/
index.cfm?fuseaction=about_us.welcome (last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
210 Suborbital
Spaceflight
Sample
Itinerary,
SPACE
ADVENTURES,
http://www.spaceadventures.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=suborbital.Spaceflight_Itinerary
(last visited Aug. 19, 2013).
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addressing unlimited liability for private actors.211 But in failing
to specifically address liability for amounts less than $500
million and more than $2 billion in the CSLAA, Congress has
ceded the issue to the states.212 This inaction, when combined
with the various states’ limited liability statutes,213 represents
a symbolic derogation of the United States’ preexisting
obligation under the Liability Convention to allow for victims
to recover from harm.214
D.

State Limited Liability Statutes Are Contrary to the
Victim-Oriented Regime

Because spaceflight operators are still liable for an
amount up to the maximum probable loss, states have passed
limited liability statutes completely absolving spaceflight
operators from liability, in a race to the bottom.215 As a
supplement to the federal requirement for waivers, several
states have passed laws limiting the liability of companies
offering human spaceflight services.216 Fittingly, those states—
Virginia,217 Florida,218 New Mexico,219 Texas,220 and California221
(collectively, the “space states”)—also tend to have privately
funded and operated spaceports.222 Additionally, businesses
have proposed to build spaceports in Alabama, Washington,
Hawaii, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Indiana, and multiple locations
in Texas,223 all of which are the headquarters, states of
incorporation, or anticipated expansion sites of the major
private spaceflight companies.224 The motivation is clear:
companies with existing space operations want limited liability

See 51 U.S.C. §§ 50901-50923 (2011).
Id. § 70112.
213 See infra Part I.C.
214 See BENDER, supra note 30, at 313.
215 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 107-13.
216 Id. at 109-10.
217 VA CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-227.8-.10 (2007).
218 FLA. STAT. § 331.501 (2012).
219 N.M. STAT. ANN., § 58-31-1 to -17 (West 2013).
220 TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 507.103 (West 2013).
221 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 13999.3 (West 2013).
222 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 108-09. Currently Alaska and Oklahoma
house spaceports but have not passed limited liability laws. Weichman, supra note 58,
at 7-10; Thomas Brannen, Comment, Private Commercial Space Transportation’s
Dependence on Space Tourism and NASA’s Responsibility to Both, 75 J. AIR L. & COM.
639, 656-59 (2010).
223 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 108 (2012).
224 Id.
211
212
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protection.225 States rightly believe that they can attract private
operators by passing limited liability laws.226
In broadly analyzing the five state statutes, it is
apparent that they share many similarities with only minor
differences.227 Each state specifies the necessary language that
a waiver must contain to limit a spaceflight operator’s liability,
as per the CLSAA’s requirement.228 And while the statutes all
limit liability, none of them exempt gross negligence or
intentional torts.229 In fact, Florida, New Mexico, and California
also include carve-outs for when the operator had “actual
knowledge” or “should have known” of the danger.230
As a result of most states not having limited liability
laws, choice of law issues will likely apply in the event of a
spaceflight accident.231 Nevertheless, a majority of jurisdictions
in the United States generally enforce exculpatory clauses.232
Therefore, even if a plaintiff can win on the choice of law issue,
and convince a court to apply the law of a jurisdiction other
than the state of contract formation, the plaintiff may still lose
on the merits.233 This is because courts will likely treat the
spaceflight industry more like expeditions to Mount Everest or

225 See Meredith & Lammers, supra note 208, at 4. Even where a state already
has a limited liability statute, commercial spaceflight companies have pushed for even
greater limits on suits. Irene Klotz, Virgin Galactic Pushing for New Mexico Liability
Relief, SPACE NEWS, Nov. 21, 2012, http://www.spacenews.com/article/launchreport/32476virgin-galactic-pushing-for-new-mexico-liability-relief.
226 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 108. See Edward Helmore, Virgin
Threatens to Pull out of Projected Spaceport, GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2013),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2013/jan/13/branson-virgin-space-tourism-threat (“A
spokeswoman for Virgin Galactic said: ‘Without the legislation in place, [the state] will
be perceived as a place that is less friendly to space business . . . .’”); Mark Whittington,
New Mexico Space Tourism Dependent on Passage of “Informed Consent” Bill,
EXAMINER.COM (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.examiner.com/article/new-mexico-spacetourism-dependent-on-passage-of-informed-consent-bill (“A group of trial lawyers
succeeded in watering down [limited liability] legislation in California, which some
suggest led to XCOR moving some of its operations to Midland, Texas [which confers
greater protections to spaceflight companies].”).
227 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 110.
228 Id.; see, e.g., Meredith & Lammers supra note 208.
229 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 110.
230 FLA. STAT. § 331.501 (2012); S.B. 9, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2010);
Assemb. B. 2243, Ch. 416 (Cal. 2012); Meredith & Lammers, supra note 208, at 6-7.
231 See Meredith & Lammers, supra note 208, at 6-7.
232 See, e.g., Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 214 Cal. App.
3d 1 (Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting argument that exculpatory clause was neither
unconscionable nor unenforceable in a case involving the failure of a
telecommunications satellite to reach its desired orbit).
233 See Meredith & Lammers, supra note 208, at 6-7.
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Antarctica and less like the commercial airline industry, and
bar recovery against operators.234
Despite differences between the states’ various limited
liability statutes and enforcement, their very existence goes
against the principles and ideals set forth in the Liability
Convention and Launch Act.235 As a general matter, the state
laws bar a plaintiff from recovery once they have been informed
of the risk and consented to be a spaceflight participant.236 A
provision of that sort is absent from the Liability Convention,
which recognizes only strict and common-law fault liability.237
Even when the Convention refuses to grant “privileged victim”
status on the theory that a party has assumed the risk of
spaceflight, fault liability, at a minimum, still applies.238 The
space states, in their attempt to promote business development,
have acted against the shared international ideals that the
United States, via Congress, agreed to.239
II.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION AS A MEANS TO COMPENSATE
VICTIMS AND FOCUS INDUSTRY GROWTH

The current system of international, federal, and state
law should ideally operate to promote two goals. First, the
international and United States systems of space law should
ensure that victims of spaceflight accidents are properly
compensated for the damages they suffer.240 Second, the U.S.
federal and state systems of space law should encourage the
growth of commercial spaceflight operations.241
On its face, victim compensation and business growth
seem to be not only incompatible goals, but polar opposites.
Indeed, if the short-term economic gains that are to be achieved
through space tourism are the goal, then that assessment is
likely correct. Current space tourism, which only consists of
234 See id. But cf. Rob Coppinger, Space Tourism: Fly at Your Own Peril,
FLIGHTGLOBAL (Apr. 11, 2009), http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/spacetourism-fly-at-your-own-peril-324978 (quoting Virgin Galactic president Will
Whitehorns’s opinion on this issue: “Informed consent has worked quite well in scuba
diving, but in other industries it hasn’t. You still have to build your business on the
basis [that] those protections don’t exist because you’re talking about people’s lives.
That is the commercial aviation background coming to the fore.”) (alteration in
original).
235 See supra Part I.B.2 and Part I.C.1.
236 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 108.
237 Liability Convention, supra note 34, art. II, IV.
238 Id.
239 See KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 107.
240 See supra Part I.B.2 and Part I.C.1.
241 See supra Part I.B–C.
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sending customers on a short two-hour trip to the lower fringes
of outer space with a return to the original launch site,242
benefits from laws that limit liability.243 Those flights are more
akin to extreme sports,244 which are generally immune from
lawsuits when participants sign waivers.245 Moreover, it is
inarguable that those individual companies have an interest in
limiting their financial liability if at all possible.
But focusing so closely on crafting a legislative regime
that supports only this type of space tourism specifically, and
not commercial spaceflight generally,246 is a gamble. By
allowing for limited liability, the United States risks being
burdened with an inflexible statutory structure that may no
longer support the originally intended business model. If space
tourism is the only prospective use of the technologies being
developed, then it is perhaps conceivable to maintain the limited
liability system. That is not the case, however. To wit, emerging
technologies, including point-to-point transport, hotels in outer
space, and long-distance voyages, are currently under
development, all of which envision different goals and require
different governmental intervention.247 In fact, analysts speculate
that they may “eventually even supplant” the space tourism
market.248 In this scenario, because those activities also
242 A more complete definition of space tourism would encompass both the
above-mentioned sub-orbital space tourism, but also orbital space tourism. von der
Dunk, supra note 2, at 403-08. Examples of orbital space tourism include visits to the
International Space Station by private citizens Dennis Tito in 2001, Mark
Shuttleworth in 2002, Greg Olsen in 2005, Anousheh Ansari in 2006, and Charles
Simonyi in 2007. Id. at 404.
243 See, e.g., Jeri Clausing, Spaceport Wants Protections from Tourist
Lawsuits, ASSOCIATED PRESS BIG STORY (Jan. 7, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/
article/spaceport-wants-protections-tourist-lawsuits.
244 Lisa Grossman, California Space Law Boosts Business, Not Safety,
NEWSCIENTIST (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn22303california-space-law-boosts-business-not-safety.html (“The . . . law treats spaceflight
rather like sky-diving, requiring future [travelers] to give ‘informed consent.’ They
agree not to sue the company they fly with if they’re injured or killed in the process.”).
Guy Laliberte “the built-like-a-wrestler founder of Cirque du Soleil” described his
twelve-day stay on the International Space Station as exacting a “[considerable]
physical toll.” Hannah Elliott, Space-Traveling Cirque Du Soleil Founder On Elon
Musk: He Did the First Step for Galactic Tourism, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/hannahelliott/2012/12/12/space-traveling-cirque-du-soleilfounder-on-elon-musk-he-did-the-first-step-for-galactic-tourism.
245 See supra Part I.D.
246 This would also include point-to-point spaceflight, hotels in orbit and in
space, and trips to the moon. See von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 407-11.
247 Id.
248 S. SUZETTE BEARD & JANICE STARZYK, FUTRON SPACE TOURISM MARKET
STUDY: ORBITAL SPACE TRAVEL & DESTINATIONS WITH SUBORBITAL SPACE TRAVEL 66
(Oct. 2002), available at http://www.futron.com/upload/wysiwyg/Resources/Reports/
Space_Tourism_Market_Study_2002.pdf.
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encompass the universe of private commercial spaceflight, it may
be necessary to dismantle the limited liability model and attempt
to impose an alternative that better reflects the direction of the
industry.249 Imposing a system of law so focused on just one
facet of the industry, and potentially at the expense of the
others, is ill-advised.
Regardless which of these emerging technologies
develops first, the industry must prioritize safety in order to
achieve marketplace success.250 As then-Virgin Galactic
President Will Whitehorn explained, his company’s goal with
its space tourism business is to first establish a safety record of
no more than one accident per 50,000 flights, which would
represent a statistic on par with the commercial airline
industry.251 After accomplishing that goal, Virgin can then
transition to offering point-to-point flights,252 presumably
because they view it as a profitable enterprise.253 Additionally,
this system of flights could find acceptance in the cargo
transport industry and by the U.S. military,254 markets that
space tourism cannot fill. At Virgin’s current expected rate of
progress, however, it will take decades to log the number of
flights necessary to institute an ideal safety record.255
Accordingly, space tourism companies should increase
the amount of flights they offer to more quickly reach the goal
of offering point to point flights. Beyond demonstrating safety,
they must simultaneously dispel the perception that their
product is reserved for the wealthy, and build mass market
appeal. However, making more flights available is counterproductive if there are not enough people to fill the seats. As it
stands, market research shows that today’s dominant potential
customer base is predominantly male, in his mid-fifties, and
wealthy.256 But if ticket prices decrease, more people will be
249 Grossman, supra note 244 (quoting Professor Matthew Schaefer: “Once we
get to 1000 flights a day for point-to-point suborbital travel, New York to Tokyo in an
hour and a half . . . , then you may need a different regulatory structure[.]”).
250 “[F]light vehicles must operate safely, reliably, and affordably in order to
sustain and grow their target markets.” GETTING FASTER: A CASE FOR HIGH-SPEED
GLOBAL POINT-TO-POINT FLIGHT AS A LOGICAL TRANSITION BETWEEN SUBORBITAL
SPACE TOURISM AND LOW-COST, REUSABLE SPACE ACCESS, FASTFORWARD STUDY
GROUP 6 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.sei.aero/eng/papers/uploads/archive/FF_
Getting_Faster_Oct2009.pdf.
251 von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 407-08.
252 Id. at 408.
253 See BEARD & STARZYK, supra note 248, at 66.
254 Jeff
Foust,
First
Steps
Towards
Point-to-Point
Spaceflight,
THESPACEREVIEW.COM (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1311/1.
255 von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 408.
256 See BEARD & STARZYK, supra note 248, at 1-2.
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increasingly willing to travel, thereby expanding the market.257
Although it seems counterintuitive, for spaceflight to reach
that wider audience, the industry must reduce prices, shed its
playboy status, and become boring, mundane, and safe.258
State limited liability statutes may therefore be more
acceptable if the only issue was promoting space tourism at the
expense of properly informed and consenting participants.
Advocates of that position would still need to justify
circumventing the United States’ international obligations
under the ideals of the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability
Convention, but the position may nevertheless be defensible in
the interest of economic development. However, the space
states are focused on crafting a narrow response to a singular
issue—space tourism—whereas there exists an entire
commercial spaceflight industry that encompasses several
different, but related sectors. That means those limited liability
statutes may have the actual effect of hurting the industry. By
taking away a potential plaintiff’s ability to bring suit, the
states are foreclosing a class of customers, the risk-averse, to
the spaceflight industry. This also necessarily lessens a
company’s ability to create a track record of safety, thereby
slowing the path to the potentially more profitable mass
market,259 and a more diversified private commercial spaceflight
business. Because the states’ limited liability statutes arguably
impact both victims and the spaceflight companies negatively,
Congress should enact national standards that disallow their
existence.
Because the space states are all self-interested in
attracting businesses, it is unrealistic to expect that they will
unilaterally repeal their limited liability statutes,260
particularly because some of those businesses are arguably
committed solely to remaining space tourism companies.261 In
this sense, the states and those companies are similar in that
they are willing to benefit at the expense of an overarching goal.
The states wish to enrich themselves in favor of national and
international goals, and the dedicated space tourism companies
wish to enrich themselves in favor of the continued healthy
Id. at 20-21.
See ADEBOLA ET AL., supra note 8, at 36-37, 77.
259 See BEARD & STARZYK, supra note 248, at 52, 59.
260 See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 244; Whittington, supra note 213.
261 To the author’s knowledge, of the major space tourism companies, Virgin
Galactic is the only company that has discussed plans of point-to-point transport. See
von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 407-08.
257
258
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growth of the industry at large. Accordingly, federal preemption
is the most sensible solution in that it has the ability to be
sufficiently far-seeing to ignore those short-term interests.
Regardless of the plan that Congress adopts, it must, at
a minimum, modify or eliminate the limited liability spaceflight
statues as they currently exist in the space states. As a starting
point, Congress may consider amending the Launch Act’s three
tier recovery system by lowering the first tier damage cap of
$500 million to an amount that would adequately compensate a
victim, but would not bankrupt a spaceflight company. As a
supplement to that, Congress could create an “obligatory
insurance regime, or [a national] compensation fund” supported
by fees collected from private parties.262
Even if Congress does not accept the premise that
eliminating limited liability is in the country’s best interests, a
uniform national law would provide certainty for commercial
spaceflight companies. As the commercial spaceflight industry
continues to develop and mature, the necessity of implementing
changes to the current legislative regime will only grow. If the
United States is to remain the leader in outer space activities,
Congress must act sooner, rather than later.
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